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Paul Kennedy inclines ever toward sweeping themes. Distinguished historian and teacher
of an acclaimed course on grand strategy at Yale University, his most famous book is The
Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict. His new
book, The Parliament of Man, is likewise daunting in scope, a history of the rise of the
United Nations and the efforts of the last hundred years at global governance.
Kennedy is, in Anglo-American academic tradition, is what is called a “Whig historian” –
historical teleologist. He offers a view of history marked by, not just definite moral
ideas, definite ideas of right and wrong in history, what constitutes good people and
enlightened government, but further and crucially by a firm (if only occasionally explicit)
belief that history is gradually working itself out according to this telos, historical
progress toward those moral ends. It arises from an honorable impulse, a belief in the
ability of human beings collectively to exercise their agency toward the good, but it also
raises questions of objectivity as to whether history is indeed working itself out toward
those moral ends – and when, exactly – and, naturally, disputes over what those moral
ends should be.
The idea of historical and moral progress was at the core of The Rise and Fall of the
Great Powers, but it was there expressed inversely. That book was a treatise on
economic and political decline – specifically, the apparently inevitable decline of the
United States, considered morally-historically against the decline of other empires.
American political decline would apparently be the inevitable result of economic
weakness arising from an imperial proclivity toward war, conflict, and militarization.
The historical scope was enormous (the years 1500 to 2000) but the moral subtext
disconcertingly narrow, focused almost entirely (as it seemed to me both on its
publication and re-reading it today) on the late Cold War and, come to it, the Reagan
years and the military buildup associated with them. Five centuries of history in order to
explain five short years of American experience, and those five years then still

1
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1265833

underway? Rarely has the leap been quite so intellectually unprotected, bungee jumping
without fastening the cord: from the unimpeachable, but also uninformative, observation
that no empire in the course of history has lasted forever, to the claim that the American
empire was teetering. And that is even accepting the claim that American empire is an
empire and not a hegemon fundamentally different in kind from, say, imperial Spain or
Britain.
The sotto-voce moral-historical lesson behind Kennedy’s apparently dismayed, sorrowing
voice of warning was plain enough; American decline is historically inevitable, but
overall it is, for the whole world, a good thing. That and (as I recall when the book came
out) oodles of schadenfreude in Europe, a self-satisfied sense of political karma justified
by a British professor at Yale explaining it all as History. But karma is a slippery thing
and so, in the endless turning of the wheel of this world of illusion and desire, ephemera
and impermanence, Professor Kennedy’s book appeared in 1987, a scant two years before
the fall of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, the liberation of eastern and central
Europe, and American victory in the Cold War. One man left standing, and not Soviet
communism. American decline? Yet Kennedy’s reputation has not suffered, least of all
outside the United States (the book has been translated into twenty-three languages, after
all) because it was always an expression of hope over experience. As if to say, ‘Some
day (God willing) it will be true’: the essence of Kennedy’s historiography, a historical
claim conjoined to a moral plea to make it so.
Kennedy’s new book, The Parliament of Man, is the flip-side of the same conjoined
American declinism-Whig historical progressivism that characterized The Rise and Fall
of the Great Powers. What many in 1987 (at least in the United States) took to be
Kennedy’s pessimism failed to understand that it was (from his standpoint and the
standpoint of many in Europe) actually “progress.” If progress was defined in the earlier
book as the decline of American power, in the new book it is defined only slightly
differently as the rise of the United Nations and “global governance.” Progress is the
(presumably) emerging hegemony of international institutions of governance,
replacement of the hegemony of the United States with the (presumably) emerging
hegemony of the United Nations. The emergence of global governance and the
hegemony of the United Nations are understood, however, to depend upon the
(presumed) decline of American power. And so the first book and the second only really
make sense together. They are the continuation of the same teleological moral-historical
project.
There are many presumptions here, less about the past than the future. Kennedy’s
academic field is history, but the reason people read him is that he is a speculative
futurist. Each book purports to be about the past, but in fact each uses the past to will
into existence a certain shared moral vision of the future. Each book offers this moral
future as always being a historical possibility – and why not, since historical possibilities
can hardly ever be ruled out a priori? Yet somehow, in real life, the moral vision seems
always to be an indefinitely receding horizon. American decline or the rise of global
governance, either way, Kennedy reads the fitful evidence across long periods of time to
favor the glass half full, gradually filling; and yet it never seems quite to get there, never
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quite reaches the fullness of time. Like those mad American evangelists who prophesy
the end of the world, but then have to recalculate on a regular basis, Kennedy’s telling of
history is a form of soothsaying.
II
But I get ahead of myself. The subtitle of The Parliament of Man in this splendidly done
Spanish translation is the “history of the United Nations.” The subtitle in the original
English is, more tellingly, more teleologically, the “past, present, and future” of the
United Nations. “Parliament of man” refers to an 1837 poem of the young Alfred Lord
Tennyson, Locksley Hall. The poem offers a rapturous “vision of the world” of the
future. Its best known passage alludes to all the “wonders that would be,” in images
simultaneously modern and romantic. It is remarkable as both vision and poem, and
Kennedy does well to use it as the book’s epigraph and ideological frame. Indeed, a quite
fascinating historical note at the beginning of the book points out that this particular
poem had a real-world effect: over a century later, the American president Harry Truman
carried a copy of this poem about in his wallet and, when asked why he supported
international institutions such as the incipient United Nations, would pull it out to read
aloud.
Truman was not alone in taking his moral cue from that hundred-plus year old poem; it
has inspired internationalists over generations, and even Winston Churchill made note of
it. But Locksley Hall is Kennedy’s moral compass as well – it “runs through the present
work,” he says. It defines his Whig historiography and his futurism, and he is honest in
putting it front and center. Mankind, Kennedy draws from the poem, is going to destroy
itself unless it invents “some form of international organization to avoid conflict and
advance the common humanity.” But though this is the centuries-running theme of all
those many novels, poems, essays, scholarship, monographs, sermons, eulogies,
polemics, jeremiads, songs, speeches, television shows, movies, videogames, and even
Internet ‘second life’, is that what this poem tells us? If so, the gaps in the poem, its
crucial interstices, its elisions, portend the possibility of something very different.
Tennyson writes at the onset of the Industrial Revolution in Britain. Looking forward, he
foresees the growth of global commerce, trade across the heavens – the “skies,” he says,
filled with airships “dropping down costly bales.” Free trade and incipient economic
globalization, fuelled by technology; it is not unfamiliar to us today. But then those same
skies are filled with war, the “nations’ airy navies grappling in the central blue.” Why,
we are not told. Perhaps over that same global commerce, nations fighting for advantage
over those “costly bales,” the poet does not say, but he does imagine, for example, the
future horror of aerial bombardment, war in which there “rain’d a ghastly dew.” Yet
finally, somehow, after this war waged across the skies, the “war-drum throbb’d no
longer, and the battle-flags were furl’d.”
Come next the planetary utopia, the end of national conflicts and wars. But here the
poem pauses in profound ambiguity. The war drums cease to throb and the battle flags
are furled, “In the Parliament of man, the Federation of the world.” Yet the poem is quite
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silent as to how this is to come about. It is ambiguous on precisely the central point. Is
this ‘Parliament of man’, this ‘Federation of the world’, the cause of global peace or
instead its effect? War’s ceasing in the parliament of man? What is the meaning of this
in? The question of cause and effect is not irrelevant even if the poem elides it. Nor is it
irrelevant (it hardly needs saying) for Kennedy’s Whig history – and the heart of the
matter is whether his book elides it, too.
Locksley Hall is culturally a product of nineteenth century Britain that can still reach out
to stir the sentiments of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. But it partakes of a
vastly more ancient tradition of utopianism, stretching back several thousand years and
yet also still able to stir us today. Consider the famous sentiment – nay, prophecy –
inscribed at the headquarters of the United Nations in New York, taken from the second
chapter of Isaiah: “They shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into
pruninghooks: nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war
any more.” Yet unlike Tennyson, the Biblical writer offers specifics, in the verses
preceding, how this wondrous condition comes to pass. It is the most interesting, if most
overlooked, passage in the chapter, and unsurprisingly it is not chiseled into the walls of
the headquarters building at Turtle Bay:
And it shall come to pass in the last days, that the mountain of the Lord’s
house shall be established in the tops of the mountains, and shall be
exalted above the hills; and all nations shall flow unto it. And many
people shall go and say, Come ye, and let us go up to the mountain of the
Lord, to the house of the God of Jacob; and he will teach us of his ways,
and we will walk in his paths: for out of Zion shall go forth the law, and
the word of the Lord from Jerusalem.
At that day, the Lord will “judge among the nations, and shall rebuke many peoples.”
Then – and only then – shall they beat their swords into plowshares and universal peace
obtain.
The writer of Isaiah describes an eschatological peace, the peace of the end of days. But
he understands as a matter of course that this requires an eschatological cause. The Lord
in the mountain of the Lord’s house. One law coming from one place to all nations and
all peoples. One judge before whom all nations come. Tennyson, by contrast, is a
modern – a modern even if a romantic. While he proclaims an apparently eschatological
peace, he has available to bring it to pass neither the Lord of Hosts nor even, seemingly, a
genuinely transcendental (albeit secular) moving cause. On the contrary, the closest
Locksley Hall comes to describing the proximate cause of this outbreak of global peace is
pragmatic and practical, mild ratiocination, nothing at all transcendental: The “common
sense of most,” he says, shall hold a “fretful realm in awe.” After having passed through
“fretful” times – violent and troubled times, in other words – majoritarian common sense
shall bring about what, in today’s terms, sounds remarkably like Francis Fukuyama’s
“end of history.” The “kindly earth” shall “slumber” in the lap of “universal law.”
III
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And so the dilemma in the moral heart of Kennedy’s history. On the one hand, the quest
is to achieve an eschatological peace, but with means that are non-eschatological,
commonsensical, modern, rational and even majoritarian. From un-utopia to utopia; but
are the means sufficient to the ends? Or, on the other hand, we might deny that the peace
sought is eschatological – we might claim instead that it is merely the tranquillitis ordinis
that Augustine made the proper object of earthly government – and it is therefore within
our modern, rationalist means. But then two further problems. If the means are rational,
then they must be truly rational. Any proposal for global tranquillitis ordinis must
therefore take account of the rationality problems of collective action – the tendency of
parties to help themselves to benefits offered in common but to refuse individually to
bear the costs. Locksley Hall refers passingly to “most” people and their “common
sense” as the solution to this problem. Yet it is precisely commonsense – rationality –
that advises each to promise publicly to support the commonweal, but then instead to
defect privately and play ‘beggar thy neighbor’. This is the problem that realists of
international relations have always raised, on global issues ranging from international
security to the Kyoto Protocol.
Moreover, if the ends, and not simply the means, are merely rational, pragmatic, and
commonsensical, why is the whole political undertaking of international organizations
forever wrapped and infused with so much idealism and romanticism as to look, yes,
eschatological? Glorious perpetual peace and all that? The ideological rhetoric that
surrounds the UN – the rhetoric that permeates The Parliament of Man – has a constant
and peculiar trope, always looking beyond the dismal, sordid, and not infrequently
corrupt present of the United Nations to the glorious transcendental future of global
governance on offer. It is as though the present UN were a sickly sapling, but we must
still, each and every time, excuse its failings because we look forward to the marvelous
overarching tree of global governance that the sapling is to become. This is, roughly,
Kennedy’s book – it is his Whig moral history in a single metaphor. The rest of the book
is more or less about convincing us to keep going with the sickly sapling that never,
however, grows up to become the tree.
The grand enterprise might surely, at some point, be judged a mistake. Might not the best
be the enemy of the good? Might the optimists’ hope turn out to be false – that one can
pursue a “pragmatic,” “efficient,” “good governance” UN of limited aims, ambitions,
tasks, and mandate in the present and, simultaneously, pursue the vast ideal of genuine
global governance for the future, a truly federal world of tomorrow? A false proposition,
at least on the accumulated evidence? Perhaps the acceptance of the visionary ideal for
the future somehow insidiously precludes (corrupts, to be precise, and holds hostage) the
possibility of a more modest, but also more effective, UN of the present. An essay in El
Pais by British journalist John Carlin (07-09-2008) recently complained about the
relative invisibility of the current Secretary General, Ban Ki Moon, at least by
comparison to his predecessor, Kofi Annan; it complains by extension that the UN as a
whole is less visible than it was a few years ago. Certainly the desire of Ban Ki Moon,
quintessential diplomat, to be less visible than his ‘rock star’ predecessor is plain on its
own terms –but perhaps Ban Ki Moon is also seeking, with good reason, to restructure
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the idea and expectations of the UN away from the glorious future tree in favor of another
vision altogether of the UN, a UN of few pretensions to glorious global governance, a
UN aiming not at an overarching tree, but instead at creating a series of low, sturdy,
limited hedge rows that perform competently their precise and limited functions. Would
this not be a better vision of the United Nations than a Paul Kennedyesque vision that it
cannot possibly bring to pass and which, worse, in loudly announcing but failing to bring
to pass, will cause much damage in its wake? But this is a hard doctrine to preach in the
European Union, of course, where whole university departments, institutes, centres of
advanced study (all well-subsidized by the EU itself) are devoted to exactly that
optimism with regard to the EU itself as a constitutional order – and, with remarkable
frequency, to the view that the same constitutional structure can be scaled up by analogy
from the EU to the world as a whole.
Yet even this skepticism about the optimists’ faith still takes the moral desirability of this
vision of the UN on its own moral terms. It merely raises realist skepticism about
whether it is possible to get there. One might further dispute (as certainly I do) that
Kennedy’s vision of global governance is morally the right one. I would propose instead
a vision of global order based around the robust multilateral cooperation of democratic
sovereigns that, nonetheless, remain both democratic and sovereign because they are the
legitimate expression of particular political communities in a way that the “world” can
never be. But even accepting the premise of Kennedy’s moral vision, must the frankly
unimpressive present of the UN be forever justified on account of the UN’s glorious
future to come, if only we persevere? Can it be forever justified that way? It is
unfortunately characteristic of Kennedy’s self-imposed blinders – blinders that he
imposes without further ado on his readers – that he devotes, for example, one single
sentence to the oil-for-food scandal, in which Saddam was able to corrupt the UN’s
sanctions program at a cost of billions of dollars and vaster cost to his own people.
Indeed, in an astounding mischaracterization, Kennedy deftly deflects blame for the UN’s
corruption away from the UN (the “Iraq canker,” he calls it with masterful imprecision)
and back, finally, onto the US for its insistence on UN sanctions on Saddam’s regime.
The intellectual quality of this book would be considerably improved if its default
position were not that anything bad can eventually be blamed on the US.
It is not that The Parliament of Man simply refuses to acknowledge either the failures of
the present UN, or the justification of its continuing failure, by appeal to the future.
Intellectual defenders of the UN such as Kennedy simply do not to see the rife
contradictions as any serious intellectual problem. Instead the inconsistencies are taken
as an opportunity to switch back and forth at will from one justification to another.
Idealism, utopianism, and glorious future of global governance at one moment; and
pragmatism, narrow rationality, and practical problem-solving in the present at the next.
What might have been thought grave inconsistency, intellectual bobbing and weaving, is
instead offered as the best of all intellectual worlds.
Kennedy therefore jumps freely among these intellectual positions in order to tell, as he
sees it, a “story of human beings groping toward a common end, a future of mutual
dignity, prosperity, and tolerance through shared control of international instruments.”
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The Parliament of Man seems sometimes to seek a bridge from the rational to the
transcendent. Other times it backs off to suggest that international organization is finally
all aimed at narrow pragmatics. I find these switches unsustainable. But in any case, the
moral narrative that The Parliament of Man would like to tell – of the gradual, upward,
evolutionary climb of human cooperation across nation-states finally to genuine global
government – is eclipsed by having to explain the persistent gap between the apparent
limits of rational cooperation and the utopian ideals that are supposed to animate the
whole enterprise. The gap dominates Kennedy’s history of the United Nations; it is what
finally must be explained. The UN is also, he notes, a “tale of multiple setbacks and
disappointments.” But Kennedy tells this tale in the way that a devout priest writes about
the Church. Global governance is, finally, Kennedy’s religion, and so the UN’s constant
lapses from virtue and goodness and rationality are explained as the inevitable errors of a
pilgrim church finding its path, not as a reason to doubt the faith.
IV
Kennedy begins by distinguishing the UN and its founding from the earlier League of
Nations. The Allies, he notes, who founded the UN had a reasonably clear idea of why
the League had failed – an excess of idealism over realism, plus the fact that the League
suffered from some specifically and spectacularly wrong notions of how collective
security might work, or not. The UN’s founders sought to build the new organization
with structures that would recognize the world as it actually existed. Kennedy’s account
of the actors fashioning the fundamental architecture of the UN in the years 1941-45 –
their heroic sense of the mission of the postwar even in the midst of war, yet their keen
awareness that the structure of this new United Nations would have to be grounded in
interests rather than merely ideals – is the best part of the book. It is diplomatic history
keenly observed, and it will be a standard account for years to come. The war itself,
Kennedy observes, sharpened those diplomats’ sense of the necessity of keeping a firm
eye on interests and not just ideals. Indeed, we can add, their watchword might well have
been, ‘No More Kellogg-Briand Pacts’, international instruments that promise an easy
universal peace but cannot possibly deliver and, much worse, deliver war as the
consequence of their misbegotten promises.
Yet in another sense, those wartime founders continued all the same old idealisms and
introduced some new ones, principally by adding the idea of human rights as a
foundational ideal alongside the ideal of international peace. No question that these new
ideals have deep roots; no question as well that they introduce new tensions and demands
upon an international system that starts out with the goal of international peace and
security (surely difficult enough) but which gradually adds the seeming sum of all human
values, and most of those expressed in the language not just of aspiration, but of right. In
order to understand this gradual unfolding of mission, Kennedy turns from comparison to
the League to the main work of the book, a series of thematic chapters setting out in
parallel the main values and, by extension, the work of the UN. The Parliament of Man
is not in any sense a guide to the institutional UN – it is emphatically not, Kennedy says,
a guide to the “alphabet soup” of UN agencies. Yet for exactly that reason, and despite
my reservations about Kennedy’s agenda, this is an excellent book for explaining the UN
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and, given its deep affinities for the organization, one of the best efforts in public
diplomacy on the UN’s behalf, on its own terms and within its own ideology. Kennedy
treats the broad themes of the UN’s work in three categories (which in any case are
announced in the first article of the UN Charter): collective security; economic agendas
of global north and south, and international development; and human rights and universal
‘values’.
UN collective security was borne out of two contradictory impulses. On the one hand, it
began with the realist recognition that collective security must be enforced by the Great
Powers and, as a consequence, must be consonant with their interests or at least not too
directly contrary to any one of them. On the other hand, it internalized an idealist
expectation that the Security Council would gradually evolve as an institution not just of
Great Power confabulation, but of genuine global governance – into what former UN
Secretary General Kofi Annan described as recently as 2005 as “our fledgling global
collective security system.” Sixty years on and yet still “fledgling” surely ought to raise
some intellectual alarm bells. So which is it to be? A conference table where the Great
Powers can try and hammer out multilateral deals – a talking shop preferable, where
possible, to war? That was, Kennedy says, how Dwight Eisenhower praised the UN in
the 1950s. Yet that vision of Great Power multilateralism is, Kennedy adds, a “long way
from the early vision of a federation of the world” – and from the collective security
system, fledgling or otherwise, that Annan simultaneously asserted and imagined upon
completing his second term in office. It is not impossible to be both, as ever say the
optimists; one the daily reality and the other “evolving” in expectation of the future, and
this is Kennedy’s hope: Whig history, once again.
Kennedy traces the Security Council’s mostly derailed path leading up to and then into
the Cold War, with the Security Council frozen between the great two antagonists. The
Security Council was little more than a talking shop in those years, and often not even
that. Yet a certain kind of collective security did hold in those years – not on account of
the UN, but because the two antagonists were fundamentally status quo powers unwilling
to risk general conflagration. Hopes for the UN unleashed by the end of the Cold War,
Bush pere’s call for a New World Order apparently based around international
institutions, collective security finally enshrined in the Security Council, global
governance finally on the horizon – it is hard to overstate the excitement that many
liberal internationalists felt in those heady days of the fall of the Berlin Wall. Indeed, in a
perverse sense, Saddam’s invasion and annexation of Kuwait was a fortuity, from the
abstract standpoint of evolving global governance, because it was so nakedly a violation
of everything the UN Charter stood for in the way of aggression, territorial conquest, the
crudest violations of international peace and security, and internal genocide and crimes
against humanity against the Kurds to boot. Everything bad in a single package, as it
were; a peg for every interventionist to hang his hat.
V
The subsequent wars of the Yugoslav succession and Rwanda in the 1990s forcefully
brought everyone back to the realization that the Great Powers had interests, and they
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also had un-interests, and moreover that collective security in the Security Council had
not magically, with the end of the Cold War, solved the problem of collective action and
free-riding. But Kennedy significantly treats the collective action problem as one of the
world system as a whole, the classic collective action problem of collective security,
insincere promising and easy defection, and free-riding. This is the customary
international relations account, and he accepts it. But as a consequence, he therefore
treats the US simply as a special case of an especially powerful, dominant, even
hegemonic actor (particularly when recounting the diplomatic run-up in the UN to the
2003 Iraq invasion) within the unitary world system. This is true as far as it goes – this
collective action problem is of course real – but it does not fully capture the true
collective action conundrum of the UN and collective security, or fully account for the
role of the United States.
The truest description of the international security situation since 1990 is that it is a
conjoined and parallel UN-US security system. It is best described as two parallel,
interlinked security systems – a weak one, the UN collective security apparatus, and a
strong one, the US security guarantee. Understood this way, the US is not merely a, or
even the, dominant and most powerful actor. Rather, the US offers a genuinely
alternative system of international peace and security. And the dominant actor’s
willingness to extend a security guarantee to a sizable portion of the planet, explicitly and
implicitly, alters the meaning, necessity, and quality of collective security at the UN
itself. They are two different game-theory scenarios – a dominant actor within a UN
collective security-defection international relations “game”; versus an actor that offers its
own security package alongside that of the UN in a parallel collective security “game.”
In a diplomatic system characterized (in game theory terms) by insincere public
promises, easy defection, moral hazard, and free-riding, the fig leaf is assiduously
maintained that the UN constitutes, or anyway offers, a collective security system.
Whereas in fact, most leading players in Europe, Asia, and Latin America, and even the
Middle East, are unwilling to test the strength of that system: insincere lip service to the
UN system while actually relying on the United States.
A realist might say, in other words, that for all the extant elite complaining and populist
anti-Americanism, a remarkable number of countries have counted the costs of adherence
to the US security promise and found it rather better than their own, and better than the
UN’s, and better than anything else on offer, as to both benefits and costs. After all, the
US does not even particularly care when those under its security hegemony (which
extends far beyond its allies or clients to provide, perversely, significant stability benefits
even to America’s acknowledged enemies) heap abuse on it (justified or not) because, in
the grand scheme of things, it understands (however inchoately and inconstantly) that the
system incorporates (often heartfelt but, in the final policy result, insincere) public
rejection and protest by the system’s beneficiaries. The US is not imperial in a way that
would cause it much to care. Part of accepting US security hegemony by its beneficiaries
includes their rational desire to displace security costs onto another party, even if that
providing party thereby has equally rational reasons to look to its own interests first,
since it so overwhelmingly pays the costs.
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Acceptance also includes realistic appraisal of the alternatives: would Europe (let alone
Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Indonesia, India, the Philippines, New Zealand, or
Australia, or even Russia) prefer, for example, Chinese hegemony to the US? The crisis
in Georgia has forced a little bit of discussion – less than the current newspaper headlines
suggest, however – on the mission and role of Nato. On the one hand, Europe is in
strategic disarray with the reassertion of regional Russian imperial will; the interests of
those close to it are different from those far away and at some point even the United
States will wonder, as a matter of budget and defense plans, what Nato is worth: how
long does a hegemon support its free riders? Prudent, Aronian-thinkers in Europe will be
wary, above all, of liberal internationalist Americans bearing gifts of multilateralism: an
America that does not assert, rudely and brusquely, its own interests and views first
through Nato and elsewhere, an America that sings sweet songs of multilateral
interdependence is, surely, a superpower that has decided to simply go along with what
everyone else does, which is another way of saying it has tired of supporting the free
riders, which is another way of saying that it, too, says one thing but might do another,
and what it might do is not show up when the big battalions are finally needed. Prudent
Europeans fear and do not trust, above all, an America that does not put its own interests
first and carry the rest along in train. Europe will soon enough face an Iranian nuclear
weapon along with its massive dependence upon Russian natural gas, even as its military
strength declines yearly – hourly – and in important respects it is today at least arguably
more dependent on the American security guarantee, not less, than at any time since
1990.
Come to that, one does not hear a great clamor among Europeans for the collective
security of the UN, in the form of calls for resolution of the Georgia crisis by action of
the Security Council – for obvious reasons. And yet, if one gives up the idea of the
Security Council as the seat of collective security governance and understands it as the
talking shop of the great powers, then it performed as well as should be expected. Of
course it resolved nothing – but the architecture of the Security Council in the UN
Charter anticipates that in a conflict among great powers on the Council, of course it
cannot resolve anything. But it did provide a talking shop in which it was as a matter of
course assumed that active, relatively public discussions would take place there – and,
moreover would take place not just between antagonists, but much more publicly with
other great powers, and even with non-great powers represented in rotation at the
Council. The Security Council performed well in the Georgia crisis, given what it is, not
badly.
But if we are indeed moving toward a more multipolar world – at least in certain regions,
the Russian ‘near abroad’ or the Chinese periphery – then the great power conflicts
promise to become more acute, not less. As David Rieff has pointed out, multipolarity is
by definition competitive, not coooperative. In such a world, the Security Council
performs a vital, but perforce limited, function as multilateral talking shop for those
conflicts – and its ability, as one hopes Ban Ki Moon and his advisors understand, to
perform that function depends fundamentally on accepting its limitations. The rapturous
fantasies of global governance that feature so prominently among liberal internationalists
– Professor Kennedy and nearly all professors of international law, for example – are not
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just a quaint holdover in a multipolar world, they are today an affirmative danger,
because they tempt institutions beyond their limits in time of crisis. The grand irony, for
which Georgia perhaps serves as a harbinger, is that the most propitious time for
dreaming of global governance was precisely when the US was at its maximum, largely
unopposed strength, because it allowed much of the world, much of the democratic
industrialized world, the luxury of imagining that its security was one thing, when it fact
it was another.
There are people in the world who must rely on the UN collective security apparatus; and
not to their benefit. Why? Because not even America’s peculiarly changeable
combination of interest and ideals extends everywhere: Darfur and Congo, for example.
An important reason why the dual system persists is that the US and the industrialized
world that takes its stability from US hegemony together see the UN system as the least
costly system for enforcing minimum order in the hopeless world of failed and failing
states – places that they will not, and realistically cannot, police (pace Afghanistan). But
all this is emphatically not the system as Kennedy describes it; he offers instead the
classic collective action problem located at the UN itself, in no small part because it is
built into his a priori moral vision of the rise of UN hegemony necessarily through US
decline. Kennedy might profitably consider that the existing UN system is one that is
publicly in perpetual crisis and yet somehow, because of the parallel US security
guarantee, never truly forced to a crossroads. It seems more plausible to see the UN in
collective security as actually stable, to the point of stasis and stagnation. Even episodic
protestations of crisis are an integral part of the quotidian theatre of the UN cul-de-sac.
On nearly every measure – population, influence, military might – the Security Council’s
five permanent members are completely unrepresentative of the world; Kennedy devotes
much discussion to the issue, as one would expect if one thought the Security Council
ought someday to be the principal organ of global security. After all, the Council is not
even especially a collection of the great powers anymore. This issue was (foolishly) the
dominant discussion in largely abortive UN reform negotiations that took place in 20045: how to alter the composition of the Security Council to make it more realistically a
meeting ground of the great powers, and how to make it more representative of the world
as an idealized institution of global governance. Kennedy candidly acknowledges that
there is no solution to this issue; Kofi Annan, to his credit, urged the main players in UN
reform to leave this question aside in favor of more urgent questions that could be
resolved. The main antagonist was not the United States, whose place on the Council is
beyond question and is thus in the rare position of being a relatively neutral “honest
broker” on the issue. The disputes arose instead from the lesser and declining military
powers, France and Britain, as against the clamors of Japan, India, Nigeria, Brazil, and
even economically powerful but de-militarized Germany. Yet even if the existing
“permanent five,” holding a veto, would accept any alteration, in real life Japan is
checked by China, India by Pakistan, Brazil by its Latin American neighbors, Germany
by the global recoil at a third EU permanent member and, alas, it is far from
inconceivable that, in the next quarter century, Nigeria might fall into grave civil war.
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Nonetheless, to a large extent Kennedy insists on telling the tale of the Security Council
in the post-Cold War period as largely an ‘America versus the world’ story – a morality
tale of heroic liberal internationalists checkmated by Republican Party intransigence. It
is both tiresome and seriously misleading to devote so much of the text to minor and
parochial issues of US politics in what is supposed to be a discussion of the world
system. It is as though Kennedy, whose prose is otherwise lapidary, stunningly clear, and
entirely free of academic jargon, suffers from a sort of political Tourette’s Syndrome that
causes him suddenly and inexplicably to lapse into irrelevant criticism of the US for this
or that. Of what conceivable importance, for example, is his Little Englander digression
on the virtue of the BBC over US news programmes, or any of a dozen other
indulgences?
The US, as Madeline Albright famously said, is the ‘indispensable party’, but what
matters are not the little bits of internal US political wickedness that Kennedy cannot
shake from his mind, but instead a much more basic fact that much of the industrialized
world accepts the US role and depends upon it regardless of what is said. Kennedy fails
to take account of a conjoined UN-US security system that prominently features
diplomatic insincerity. He moreover assumes, as ever, a specific normative direction for
“progress,” toward a genuinely UN system of collective security. Suppose, instead, that
UN collective security is what everyone wants in theory but no one wants in practice? In
any case, the rise of a new, multipolar world – not the decline of the United States as
such, but instead, as Fareed Zakaria argues in a new book, The Post American World, the
rise of new powers such as India and China, and the global risks posed by ‘resource
extraction authoritarian states’ such as Russia, Venezuela, Saudi Arabia, and Iran – offers
the opportunity to see how much America’s allies and friends, and for that matter its
enemies, actually want to give up the stability proffered by America’s security guarantee.
That new world might offer much in the way of schadenfreude – it might not, however,
be a thing of beauty.
VI
Economic agendas between the global north and south, international development and
economic growth generally, are the least worked-out section of the book. They do not
lend themselves very readily to diplomatic history. In any case, although throughout the
history of the UN, ideological differences over what constitutes economic development
have been sharp – permanent income transfer from the rich world to the poor, for
example, or instead permanent economic growth in the developing world? – many of the
arguments today are about means, not ends. The arguments over what works in
international development are loud and sometimes bitter – but they are mostly about what
works, not the desirability of development. The Parliament of Man is only moderately
interested in these expert, mostly economic, debates, and slides off into a broader
discussion about values and, eventually, the rise of human rights at the UN. But there is
an important point here, not to be lost. Some UN agencies – the World Health
Organization, for example, or the World Food Program – are widely considered to be
good at what they do. Often proficiency goes hand with a technical, apolitical function,
but not always. Peacekeeping operations, for example (apart from what is emerging as
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major corruption scandals involving large sums of money in procurement contracts), has
generally been considered to be reasonably effective at its mission, although it is
inherently political.
Effectiveness at the UN in fact has a simple predictor, one that Kennedy could have
noted, except that it does not quite fit the narrative. Who pays? To whom is the agency
is accountable and upon whom is it fiscally dependent? Agencies that are accountable to,
and subsist on the budget of, the General Assembly are generally bad at what they do.
Agencies that are independently funded by voluntary contributions from donor countries
in practice are much more effective. The policy implications are clear. Indeed, they have
long been clearer to European aid agencies than to the United States. Fund the things that
work, and demand accountability for voluntary contributions. The regular UN budget of
the General Assembly for 2004-5 was approximately US $1.8 billion; the peacekeeping
budget, which is voluntary (although, for planning purposes, it is nonetheless agreed to
by assessment among donors), was approximately US $3.9 billion. Which is to say –
Kennedy never grasps this point – the developed countries’ aid agencies and large private
foundation donors have in effect been carrying out a leveraged buyout of the functional
and effective UN agencies for well over a decade. An LBO process at the UN, in fact,
with Europe leading the way – quietly, however, and never quite admitting to it. A
privatization, or at least ‘re-lateralization’ among the rich countries, of international
institutions and global governance, if you will.
The rest mostly lies in the hands, and the budget, of the General Assembly. Funded by
mandatory dues, the General Assembly’s budget is paid overwhelmingly by a handful of
wealthy countries. The Parliament of Man operates at far too rarified an altitude to pay
attention to the cash. It has, astonishingly, no serious discussion of funding even though
one might have thought that the first mechanism for understanding the organization is to
follow the money – as public choice theory or, for that matter, a marxist might say,
follow the material conditions underlying UN ideology to identify its “objective
interests.” So many, many pages dissecting proposals for reforming the Security Council
that will, in fact, go nowhere, but no serious discussion of money? Kennedy really is a
platonist at heart. The money exercise is slightly harder than it looks, however, as the
UN does not have a unified budget; the Secretariat admits it does not really know how
much it spends or even how many employees it has. The first ten countries’ dues amount
to about 76% of the regular budget for 2004-5 (the US is first at 22%, and Spain is
number eight at 2.5%, just ahead of China at 2.07%), meaning that the remaining 180 or
so countries in the world together account for merely a quarter of that budget, and the
bottom 100 countries or so for effectively none whatsoever.
Whatever the distributive justice of that arrangement, it is also a clear incentive for the
non-paying majority in the General Assembly to extract greater and greater resources
from the paying minority. It is a game to which the paying handful called a halt some
years back (led, interestingly, by Germany). The de facto policy of the developed
countries today is clear, even if never announced as such – starve the General Assembly
of funds, or at least hold it as closely as possible to current spending, and instead devote
scarce resources to particular agencies through voluntary contributions. Money sent to
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the care and feeding of the General Assembly evaporates rapidly through rent-seeking,
moral hazard, inefficiency, impressively high UN salaries and benefits, and outright
corruption and fraud. It is unfortunate, to say the least, that Kennedy simply ignores
these facts; faced with the sordid realities, he, like so many other observers, prefers to
make general noises about how corruption and rent-seeking happen everywhere, and
retreat to the platonic categories of the glorious future of global governance. Yet it bears
noting that the rent-seeking and even the corruption, the competition and shifting
alliances and hierarchies of ownership over resources available to the General Assembly
contribute in their way to the general stability, stagnation and stasis that characterizes the
UN; the seemingly immoveable ‘UN in a cul-de-sac’ reflects in part the stability of
private deals and arrangements and rent-seeking over the General Assembly’s resources.
VII
But the General Assembly and General Assembly budget directly fund much of the
“values” apparatus of the United Nations, the underlying concepts to which Kennedy
directs much enthused attention. Yet it is a curiously dated discussion. The narrative
picks up the thread of the rise of human rights after 1945, and the explosion of human
rights discourse and concerns after the Cold War ends. Fair enough. Likewise the rise of
“global civil society” – the international NGOs which, beginning with the landmines ban
campaign of the 1990s, staked claims to be the “representatives” of the “world’s peoples”
(as Annan put it in 2000) to international organizations; likewise, fair enough, although
critics in recent years have devoted much time to debunking the inflated claims of
“representativeness.” But the rise of human rights and universal values must also take
account today of two other, linked phenomena, neither of which is easily assimilated to
the historical rise of rights discourse.
One is the gradual transformation of the language of human rights – really, universal
liberalism – through the course of the 1990s into a language of multiculturalism and
identity politics, based around religion, ethnicity, race, gender, and post-colonial status.
These all amount to claims of political privilege for particular groups that are seriously at
odds with universal liberalism – but they are expressed in the language of, and imbued
with, the sacred status of ‘rights’. What is regarded in Kennedy’s account, historically
and into the future, as “liberal internationalism” with legitimacy claims to global
governance would be more accurately rendered today as “multiculturalist
internationalism” – and equally with legitimacy claims to global governance.
The differences, despite the identical rights rhetoric, are profound, and as a political
reality today they mostly concern the fraught relationship between Islam and Muslims
globally, on the one hand, and universal, secular liberalism, including genuinely universal
human rights, on the other. The latter is gradually accommodating itself to the former,
not the other way around. More precisely, at least as far as organs of the General
Assembly are concerned, the content of “human rights” is increasingly subordinated to
the desires, interests, ideologies, and religious doctrines of the countries of the Islamic
Conference. Rights discourse, at least as far as the leading human rights bodies of the
UN are concerned, is not about universal liberalism anymore. Rights discourse has been
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drafted into the protection and assertion of religious identity in general and Islam (more
precisely, ‘Muslim-ness’, treated as a kind of claim of constitutive ethnic identity and so
facilitating the characterization of any criticism of it or its content of doctrine as racism)
in particular. The fundamental disconnect between, for example, Spain having a serious
debate over the “rights” status of the Great Apes, the exquisitely calibrated, fine-tuning of
an ideology of human rights to take into account genetic near neighbors, while at the
same time, the ideology of rights is being redefined at the UN – with barely a whimper of
protest, and none of it effective – to smash to bits the proud inheritance of Voltaire: well,
enjoy the glass-bead game while it lasts.
This is a sharp discontinuity from the historical narrative dating from 1945 or even 1990.
It does not find a place in Kennedy’s account of the UN, which prefers to spend its time
dreaming of being ‘lapt in universal law’. The de facto rise of shari’a as the actual
globalizing law moving to obtain across widening regions of the world, rather than
secular and universal human rights, does not quite fit the narrative. But consider the lead
UN agency on human rights, the Human Rights Council (which in 2005 replaced the
Human Rights Commission, on account of the Commission’s complete and utter
domination by the world’s worst human rights abusers, made possible, of course, because
they were appointed to it with clockwork regularity by the General Assembly). Kofi
Annan admirably made reform of the Human Rights Commission – its abolition, in fact,
and replacement with the Council – central to his personal reform agenda in 2005. But in
the event, nearly every important reform mechanism that might positively have impacted
the new Council was eliminated. The US stood nearly alone in opposition, warning
against a “compromise” to which, remarkably, the leading human rights NGOs foolishly
committed themselves out of little more (so far as I could tell at the time) than the desire
to ‘stick it’ to then-US ambassador John Bolton. Two years later, today, the “reformed”
Human Rights Council is, if anything, still more dominated by the world’s abusers than
the old Commission, as even the New York Times (whose editorial page typically merely
channels the UN Secretariat) made note. Plus ca change?
But just as important is the content of the Human Rights Council’s actual work on human
rights. It has some useful special raporteurs on particular subjects (although they do not
include the current special raporteur on Palestine and Israel, Richard Falk, who has
publicly and bizarrely ndorsed the possibility that American neo-conservatives plotted 911). Leave aside the Council’s grotesque, near exclusive preoccupation with Israel; leave
aside its inability to criticize, as of this writing, even so great a human rights disaster as
Zimbabwe under Mugabe; leave aside its laughable current concern that the British
monarchy might be an affront to universal human rights and that the UK ought to hold a
referendum on the matter. The serious work of the Human Rights Council today, that
which will outlive today, is to redefine the notion of human rights to be centrally about
ensuring that free speech can never be directed against a religion or, really, much of
anything else. Human rights, at least in the leading UN body devoted to the subject, is
about illiberalism. This, alas, and much more, eludes The Parliament of Man.
And so the book ends, with chapters devoted to more platonic theorizing about future
structures of global governance that might one day come to pass. It is a pleasant way for
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an intellectual to pass the time, one surmises. Indeed, The Parliament of Man closes with
an ‘Afterword’ devoted (again) to Locksley Hall. The reader of this review who thinks I
have devoted far too much attention to it here seriously underestimates what it means to
Paul Kennedy.
VIII
One might come away from the criticisms offered in this essay thinking that they are
essentially a realist critique of excessive idealism. That is true, but it is far from the
entire critical story. The more fundamental critique is not realism seeing practical
problems with a utopian idealism. It is instead idealism set against idealism, moral vision
set against moral vision. There are alternative idealisms for the world, honorable
alternatives, to that of federalized global governance. One is the ideal of a robust
multilateralism of democratic sovereigns, who dream of global cooperation, messy and
incomplete and un-platonic, not of planetary governance. Robust multilateralism accepts
the virtues of autonomous and sovereign political communities as defined in today’s
world by democratic nation states, and it seeks their deep cooperation even without the
expectation that they will find ‘ever closer union’. That seems to me, at least, a morally
better ideal than the overly-universalist dream of global governance. And yet the ideal of
the multilateralism of democratic sovereigns lacks both its Locksley Hall and its Paul
Kennedy. Given that ideal’s inherent realist modesty, its lack of puffery and hubris, alas,
it seems likely it always will.
END
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